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The Impact of Enlargement 
on the External Relations of the EU 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of the fifth enlargement on the European Union Foreign 
Policy (EUFP). In the context of the U.S attack on Iraq in 2003 and the rhetorical image 
of the “old” and “new” Europe, a pervasive perception emerged that the voice of the EU 
would be weakened after May 2004. The EU-25 is now 11 months old and many 
questions are still up in the air. Will the new members act together as a block? Are the 
new members likely to become Trojan horses for the United States and thus prevent the 
development of a European security policy? The preliminary answer is that the EU has 
undergone a gradual process of adaptation, which was initiated prior to the formal 
enlargement and continues in the context of the participation of the new members in the 
EU foreign policy making. Rather than derailing the EUFP and despite the intrinsic 
differences among national foreign policies, it seems that new and old members negotiate 
on a daily basis to find consensus and implement the objectives of the EUFP. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Ulrich Sedelmeier has argued that EU enlargement “should not be only considered the 
dependent variable in an analysis of EFP or EU identity politics, but also as an 
independent variable that affects both EU identity and EFP.”
1 The point highlighted by 
Sedelmeier reflects one of the analytical challenges of the enlargement process for the 
EUFP:  the transition from candidate country (outsider) to member state (insider). These 
two stages are part of the same process; however, both have different implications for EU 
policy making.  
 
The first dimension of enlargement comprises the ten candidate countries 
(outsiders) as objects of the policies of the EU. After May 1, 2004, however, the shift to 
the second dimension indicates that the new members are not outsiders any more and 
participate in the policy making of the external relations of the EU.  
 
Based upon this premise, the dependent variable of this analysis is the EUFP. In 
this paper, the EUFP is understood as the web of decisions, actions, and principles taken 
by European Union institutions in order to carry out interests and policies in world 
                                                           
1 Ulrich Sedelmeier, EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy: Identity 
Formation Through Policy Practice (European University Institute Working Papers, no. 2003/13, Florence, 
Italy) 1.   2
affairs.
2 Unlike the broad concept of external relations, the term “policy” reflects a 
“course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization or individual.”
3  
 
On the other hand, the independent variable is the enlargement process, which is 
understood, based upon Schimmelfenning, as a “process of gradual and formal (informal 
as well) horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms.”
4 As previously 
mentioned, the fifth enlargement of the EU presents two different characteristics in the 
pre- and post-accession stages.  
 
In the pre-accession stage, the enlargement of the EU has been the most important 
event on the old continent in the past fifteen years. The uncertainty caused by the end of 
the Cold War was guided by an EU-lead process of reinventing the constitutional 
structure and political practices of Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly, in terms of 
norms and practices, former centralized economies moved towards the EU model as 
reflected in the 80,000 pages of the acquis communitaire. In the words of two realist 
scholars, “The resulting negotiations have until recently been more than a process of 
checking off a massive and essentially non-negotiable list of EU laws and regulations, 
chapter by chapter.”
5 This stage was “mostly, but not exclusively, a one way” 
relationship, from the center (EU) to the periphery (CEEs).  
 
The post-accession stage is taking place in a new legal and normative 
environment. As members of the EU, the newcomers are able to participate in the policy 
making of the integration process and negotiate their interests from a better position than 
in the prior stage. Depending on the issue to be negotiated, they form alliances with other 
newcomers, big or Atlanticist members, just to mention a few examples of the “multiple 
lane highway” of interest interaction. Thus, the convergence between old and new 
members’ foreign and security policy behavior is likely to increase in this stage as the 
socialization effect of EU governance on the accession countries grows. 
6 
 
Thus, EUFP has undergone an adaptation process in order to respond to the 
challenges of the fifth enlargement. By policy adaptation, Michael E. Smith means 
“either a change of an existing position or the creation of a new position on an unsettled 
policy problem thanks to the state’s participation in the EPC/CFSP system. This system 
imposes specific foreign policy obligations on its member states, by virtue of EU 
                                                           
2 Roberto Domínguez, European Union Foreign Policy: Agents, Structures and Preferences (Ph D 
Dissertation, University of Miami, 2005). 
3 Pearsall, Judy, ed.  “Policy.”    The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e55183. Accessed 
September 13,  2004.   
4 Frank Schimmelfenning amd Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, 
Hypothesis, and the State of Research,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (Ausgust 2002): 503. 
5 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlargement and 
the Future of European integration,” EUSA Review 15, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 1. 
6 Nuray Ibryamova, Eastern Enlargement and the European Union’s Security Agenda (Paper 
Presented at the CEEISA/ISA International Convention Budapest, Hungary, June 26-28, 2003).   3
membership in general and particularly when holding the EU presidency or representing 
the EU abroad.”
7 Under this premise, what has been the EU foreign policy adaptation in 
the pre- and post-enlargement stages? 
 
Pre-accession stage and foreign policy  
 
In this period, there are four main features. The first is the historic trend of regional 
shifting in some areas of foreign policy every time the EU has enlarged. The UK, with its 
Commonwealth experience, pressed to change the EC’s links with the third world; the 
result was the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention, which gave birth to the Lomé 
Convention. On the other hand, in 1986, Spanish and Portuguese membership also 
prompted a more active approach toward Latin America whereas the membership of two 
Nordic states in 1995 led to the emphasis on the Northern Dimension.
8  
 
The regional or policy orientation new members bring into the EU foreign policy 
agenda does not vanish during the first years of their membership; it remains on the 
agenda. As part of the current institutional structures, the rotating presidency system is an 
opportunity for the member states to pull the EU’s external priorities in different 
directions. French, Italian and Spanish presidencies in the mid-1990s attempted to re-
balance EU attention from the east to the south (Barcelona Conference), whereas the 
Finnish and Swedish presidencies launched a series of northern initiatives (Northern 
Dimension).
9 
 
The second characteristic in the pre-accession phase is the definition and 
negotiation of the terms of accession as well as the supervision of the internalization in 
the candidates of the acquis communitaire. Out of 31 chapters set by the EU to negotiate 
the accession of new members, three are closely related to the external relations of the 
EU, namely, Chapter 25 (Customs Union), 26 (External Relations) and 27 (CFSP). 
 
Since the first day of accession, the customs administration of the new member 
states manage and control their borders, which are the new external borders of the Union. 
The acquis in Chapter 25 refers to the Community’s Common Customs Tariff, which 
includes trade preferences, tariff quotas and tariff suspensions, and other customs-related 
legislation outside the scope of the customs code, such as legislation on counterfeit and 
pirated goods, drug precursors and the export of cultural goods. Transitional 
arrangements were negotiated in only two cases. Hungary negotiated the imports of 
aluminum, and Malta was granted a five -year transitional period for the import of woven 
                                                           
7 Michael E. Smith. “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy 
Cooperation,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1 (2004): 114.  
8 Clive Archer, The European Union as an International Political actor,” in European Union 
Enlargement, ed. Neill Nugent (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 234. 
9 William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 (Groupement 
D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 5.    4
fabrics of combed wool or of combed fine animal hair, denim, woven fabrics of artificial 
filament yarn and other clothing accessories.
10 
 
On the other hand, Chapter 26 covers the Community’s economic and trade 
relations with third countries and international organizations as well as cooperation and 
assistance.  The common commercial policy has particular political significance as the 
external aspect of the single market and as the policy of the largest trading power in the 
world.
11 No transitional arrangements were negotiated in this chapter. 
 
Due to the particular intergovernmental nature of the acquis in Chapter 27 
(CFSP),
12 no transposition into the national legal order of the then candidate countries 
was necessary. Nevertheless, “as member states they must undertake to give active 
support to the implementation of the CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. 
Member states must ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions 
and defend these common positions in international fora.”
13  
 
The third feature is the approximation of positions between the EU and candidate 
members on world affairs issues. The general trend is that with “any move closer to 
membership, countries become increasingly socialized in the EU’s ways of doing 
business.”
14 In 1994, a dialogue was established at all CFSP levels to familiarize the 
newcomers with the system, which meant informing them about the CFSP acquis 
politique. Based upon Elfriede Regelsberger’s research, alignments with EU Statements 
of the Presidency grew from 25 percent in 1995 to 71 percent in 2002 in the period from 
1995 to 2003. Once the Accession Treaties were signed in 2003, the ten acceding 
countries enjoyed the status of active observers and explicitly shared the contents of all 
CFSP declarations approved since April 17 2003.
15 In the case of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, even before the signature of their Accession Treaties, most of the 
candidate countries had already achieved 100 percent alignment with EU positions and 
the EU voted unanimously on average four times out of five.
16 
 
 
                                                           
10 European Commission, Chapter 25. Customs Union  (December. 2004, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap25/, accessed February 24, 2005). 
11 European Commission, Chapter 26. External Relations (December. 2004). 
12 CFSP is not equipped with the legal instruments (directives, regulations) that exist for other 
Community policies. It uses instruments such as joint actions, common positions, statements and 
declarations, as  well as in the conclusions of the European Council and the Council. 
13 European Commission, Chapter 27. Common Foreign and Security Policy (December,  2004). 
14 Heater Grabbe, “The newcomers,” in The Future of Europe. Integration and Enlargement ed. Fraser 
Cameron (New York: Routledge, 2004), 77. 
15 Elfriede Regelsberger, Are the Problems arising from enlargement and the Draft Traty leading to 
paralysis instead of synergy? (Introductory remarks for the Fornet Group B Institutional Reform and 
Enlargement, Brussels 23 April 2004): 2-3.  
16 European Commission, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations (Luxembourg: 
European Commission, January 2004), 12.   5
Alignments of the CEECs with EU Statements of Presidency  
on Behalf of the EU 1995-2002 
Year  Total Number  Alignment CEEC  Percentage 
1995 106  27  25.2 
1996 110  30  27.3 
1997 122  35  28.7 
1998 149  58  38.7 
1999 115  59  51.3 
2000  175 122 69.7 
2001  175 124 70.9 
2002  181 130 71.8 
Source: Elfriede Regelsberger, Are the Problems arising from enlargement and the Draft 
Treaty leading to paralysis instead of synergy? (Introductory remarks for the Fornet 
Group B Institutional Reform and Enlargement, Brussels 23 April 2004): 2-3. 
 
As a result of this process of approximation, the EU-25 has strengthened its 
multilateral approaches in world affairs. On most foreign policy issues, the CEECs tend 
to side with the EU not the United States. Having fresh memories from the Soviet 
domination during the Cold War, they support the EU on issues such as non-proliferation, 
the Kyoto Protocol, the death penalty and the ICC, despite strong US pressure.  Even in 
the case of Iraq and the alliance with the United States, the Polish-Spanish multinational 
force has been weakened. Spain’s decision to withdraw troops from Iraq was followed by 
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, which were also part of the 
multinational force. Hungary ended its mission in December 2004 and the Netherlands 
withdrew its troops in March 2005. Poland announced in April 2005 that it would 
withdraw all its troops from Iraq once the United Nations mandate for the multinational 
force expires in December 2005.
17 
 
The fourth element in the pre-accession stage is the creation of new borders. With 
the first wave of EU eastward enlargement in 2004, the eastern and southern borders of 
the new member states became the new external borders of the EU (only the Czech 
Republic is entirely surrounded by EU member states). This is why the Commission 
proposed a “Wider Europe” policy for its neighbors. Then Commissioner Patten stated 
that Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be 
offered “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market and further integration and 
liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four 
freedoms).”
18  
 
In this regard, there is a recurring question about the limits on accepting new 
members. The Moroccan Government has twice, in 1987 and 2000, expressed its 
ambition to apply for EU membership. Prime Minister Berlusconi has also spoken about 
                                                           
17 Judy Dempsey, “Poland sets date for Iraq Pullout,” International Herald Tribune, April 13, 2005. 
18 Christopher Patten, EU Enlargement: Implications for the EU and Australia (Keynote Address on 
European Union Foreign Policy, National Press Club, Canberra, Australia, April 17, 2003).   6
a future Israeli application.
19 Thus, the Wim Kok Report has tackled the issue of the limits 
of the enlargement. This report states that: 
 
The positive results of the present round of enlargement show that 
stability and security can be achieved very effectively by means of 
the extension of the EU. The prospect of EU accession –through 
the conditionality of the criteria for membership—has been 
extraordinarily successful in Central and Eastern Europe in driving 
economic and political reforms. But this process cannot be 
extended indefinitely. The EU cannot simply accept every 
neighboring country that wishes to join, on the logic that 
enlargement brings peace and prosperity. This logic is ultimately 
in contradiction with the logic of cohesion (emphasis added).
20 
 
In order to provide concrete steps to manage the dilemma of the new borders, the 
General Affairs Council in April 2002 requested the Commission and the High 
Representative for CFSP to propose ideas on the relationship with its neighbors. The then 
Commission President, Romano Prodi, suggested some ideas on “A Policy of Proximity,” 
in which he argued that the enlarged EU needed “a ring of friends. We have to be 
prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership without excluding the 
latter categorically…. offering the concept of sharing everything except institutions 
(emphasis added).”
21 
 
Thus, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aims to share the benefits of the 
EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, security 
and well-being for all concerned… “It is designed to prevent the emergence of new 
dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and offer them the chance to 
participate in various EU activities… The ENP is distinct from the issue of potential 
membership”
22 In other words, “The EU’s post-2004 eastern neighbors thus constitute 
what officials in Brussels now describe as the gray zone: neither accepted as definite 
candidates, nor clearly denied the long-term prospect of membership.”
23 
                                                           
19 William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 (Groupement 
D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 6. Wallace states: “The Moroccan 
Government has twice, in 1987 and 2000, expressed its ambition to apply for EU membership; during the 
King of Morocco’s state visit to Paris, in March 2000, his official spokesman declared that the Helsinki 
European Council’s formal acceptance of Turkey’s candidate status has ‘lifted a taboo’ on the eligibility of 
other Muslim Mediterranean states.” In reaction, the Portuguese Prime Minister suggested that Moroccan 
membership could be considered within a ten-year perspective. 
20 Wim Kok, Enlarging the European Union. Achievements and Challenges (Florence, Italy: European 
University Institute, 2003), 64. 
21 Quoted in William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 
(Groupement D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 2. 
22 European Commission, What is the European Neighborhood Policy? 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm, accessed January 26, 2005). 
23 William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 (Groupement 
D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 4.   7
In the same realm of borders, another area where the new member states may 
have an impact on external policy is Russia. In general, the new members are more 
suspicious of Russia due to recent history
24 and the “the legacies of the twentieth century 
live on, not just in people’s memories but in practical issues.”
25 For example, the EU 
pushed to make fair treatment of the large Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia part of the accession criteria for those countries. It also negotiated transit 
arrangements and a visa regime with Russia for the people living in the enclave of 
Kaliningrad. 
 
 
Post-accession stage 
 
As of mid-2005, no major crisis has risen as a result of the 2004 enlargement. In fact, it 
might be speculated that the entry of new member states is more likely to reinforce 
existing trends in EU politics. Certainly, it is expected that the new member states will 
form a unified block on some issues such as increased budget, less social and 
environmental legislation, euro and Schengen accession.
26  
 
As to the impact of enlargement on EU foreign policy, the first feature is the 
accommodation of national priorities in the making of the EUFP, a process that already 
began to take place in the pre-accession phase.  The EU is in its initial steps of designing 
a Grand Strategy, although it remains to a great extent focused on the immediate regions. 
Thus,  the new members’ foreign policies - which have been mostly focused on the 
regional neighborhood with the accession to the EU and NATO as a priority- will 
emphasize the management of pending problems at the regional level. In fact, this 
accommodation of priorities is a common practice in the EUFP. For instance, in the case 
of German relations towards Latin America, Detlef Nolte has insisted that the German 
policy towards Latin America fits into the EU general approach since “many in the 
foreign policy community argue that German interests are better represented as part of a 
common European Latin America policy than individually. Others argue that this could 
be a way to get rid of a minor topic in foreign relations in order to save time for more 
serious foreign policy matters.”
27 In this regard, Spain and Portugal consider Latin 
America and the Mediterranean area at the top of their priorities. 
 
Therefore, as an old pattern of the EUFP, it is expected that each member state 
will be more assertive in those areas in which there are more national interests involved. 
                                                           
24 Fraser Cameron, “Enlargement. The Political Impact,” EPC Issue Paper no. 13, (European Policy 
Centre, April 21, 2004) 4-5. 
25 Heater Grabbe, “The newcomers,” in The Future of Europe. Integration and Enlargement ed. Fraser 
Cameron (New York: Routledge, 2004), 74. 
26 Fraser Cameron, “Enlargement. The Political Impact,” EPC Issue Paper no. 13, (European Policy 
Centre, April 21, 2004) 2. 
27 Detlef Nolte, Problems of Latin America Security and its Implications for Europe: A German 
Perspective (Jean Monnet /Robert Schuman Working Paper Series, University of Miami Vol. 4 No. 11, 
October 2004).   8
The Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2004 was a test for both the enlarged EUFP as a whole 
and the border EU countries (more affected by the likelihood of a crisis in Ukraine) as 
well. In that regard, the mediating role played by Javier Solana, HR for CFSP, Alexander 
Kwasniewski, Polish President, and Valdas Adamkus, Lithuanian President, “was 
physical embodiment of the new EU that has emerged, confident of its interest and values 
and willing to act on them. Far from weakening it, enlargement has strengthened 
CFSP.”
28   
 
Another example in which the newcomers are defending their own views in the 
EU foreign policy making is the disagreement of Czech Republic and Poland with the 
recent EU policies on Cuba. In the March/April 2003 political crackdown, Cuba arrested 
75 dissidents and sentenced them to long prison terms. In response, the EU imposed 
diplomatic sanctions and after the Cuban government released 14 of them, the EU agreed 
on January 31, 2005 to end the diplomatic freeze against the Communist regime. The 
decision, strongly pushed by the Spanish government, found some opposition from other 
EU members. The wording of the Council conclusions was changed, following strong 
opposition by the Czech Republic and Poland, who argued in favor of further support and 
public recognition for Cuban dissident leaders. Former Czech anti-communist dissident 
and ex-president Vaclav Havel joined the debate about the EU’s future policy towards 
Cuba and strongly criticized the member states for their diplomatic shift towards the 
Castro regime. “It is hard to find a better way for the EU to destroy its ideals of freedom, 
equality and respect for human rights,” Mr. Havel said.”
29 
 
A second element most visible in the post-accession phase is the leverage each 
country can exert, once they have been socialized into the EU rules and norms. In the 
organizational environment of the EU-25, Poland has started playing its role as a new big 
member. After lending unconditional support to the United States in 2003, Poland’s 
attitude towards the idea of a group of bigger member states “began to evolve as soon as 
it became clear that Poland could actually be one of the ‘ins’… Poles believe that they 
could be able to play in Europe’s first division.”
30 Some facts reinforce the view of Polish 
assertiveness in the first division European foreign policy: a) support to the idea of 
structured cooperation, b) welcome the creation of battle groups, and c) initiative in the 
Eastern Dimension of the EUFP.
31   
 
On the other hand, the more assertive role of Poland may contribute to 
strengthening the role of Germany, France, and the UK in global affairs if they can agree 
to work together. The trilateral initiative of the UK, France and Germany on Iran has 
                                                           
28 Dov Linch, “A New Eastern Question, Newsletter, Institute for Security Studies (January 2005); 
Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March-April 2005): 46.   
29 Lucia Kubosova, “EU Lifts Sanctions on Cuba,” Eurobserver, January 31, 2005. 
30 Marcin Zabotowski, From America’s protégé to Constructive European. Polish Security in the 
Twenty-First Century (Occasional Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2004): 21. 
31 The Non-Paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards Eastern neighbors after EU 
enlargement was published in January 2003. See EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy (Warsaw: 
Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003).   9
temporarily mitigated U.S. attempts to expand military action in the area and thus far 
represents a success for European diplomacy. Certainly the idea of a core Europe is not 
welcomed by medium and small states.
32 However, at least in the area of foreign policy, 
Poland, as a new big country, is pushing in that direction. 
 
On the other hand, Poland’s Atlanticism is becoming more cautious and less 
unconditional in its support of the United State in light of two major issues: a) EU 
membership and b) disappointment with America’s leadership in Iraq.
33  Thus, in 
September 2004 over 70 percent of Poles wanted their troops to be pulled out of Iraq and 
President Kwasniewski was disappointed with the firm rejection from the Bush 
administration to give a visa waiver status to Polish citizens.
34 
 
A third element in the post-accession phase comprises the formalization of the 
new wave of enlargement and the Eastern Dimension of the EU, enshrined in the ENP.  
For the time being, the European Council meeting of 16-17 December 2004 set the 
course for the EU’s continuing enlargement process in 2005-07. It was decided that 
Bulgaria and Romania should sign the Treaties of Accession in April 2005, and that full 
accession would take place in January 2007. Although Croatia got the date of 17 March 
2005 for the opening of negotiations, these were postponed in light of the Croatian failure 
to comply with the very explicit condition to take the necessary steps for full cooperation 
with the ICTY. The most important point for Turkey is that it got a date -3 October 2005- 
for the opening of negotiations.
35  
 
On the other hand, the ENP has moved forward in its development and 
implementation. Based upon the ENP’s Strategy Paper, on December 9, 2004 the 
Commission presented a first draft Action Plans with Partners countries. On March 2, 
2005, the Commission recommended an intensification of relations with Egypt and 
Lebanon, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Council will decide whether to 
develop Action Plans under the ENP with the three Caucasus countries since Action 
Plans have already been negotiated with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine.
36  
                                                           
32 Heather Grabbe and Ulrike Guérot, Could a Hard Core Run the Enlarged EU? Briefing Note 
(London: Centre for European Reform, February 2004), 5. The author  states: “France, Germany would 
need to include the UK, not only to get access to Britain’s diplomatic resources and military capabilities but 
also because without the UK a foreign and security policy venture would lack political credibility… Britain 
is not only one of the EU’s two serious military powers, it is also the only member state that can gain 
essential backing from the United States.”   
33 Marcin Zabotowski, From America’s protégé to Constructive European. Polish Security in the 
Twenty-First Century (Occasional Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2004): 5. 
34 Marcin Zabotowski, From America’s protégé to Constructive European. Polish Security in the 
Twenty-First Century (Occasional Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2004): 13-
15. 
35 Michael Emerson, “Vade Mecum for the Next Enlargements of the European Union,” CEPS Policy 
Brief no. 61 (Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2004). 
36 European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy: The Next Steps, IP/05/236 (Brussels, March 
2, 2005).  10
 
In the context of the Eastern dimension, the European Agency of External 
Borders was created in March 2005.  In addition to Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Malta were in the running to hold the agency, which is supposed to begin operating 
in Warsaw on May 1, 2005, with an annual budget of €10 million. According to the rule 
the Council adopted on 26 October 2004, the European Agency for External Borders is 
supposed “to facilitate the application of existing and future Community measures 
concerning management of the EU's external borders by coordinating Member States' 
actions to implement those measures.” 
 
A fourth element in the policy making is the pressure that the member states and 
the EU institutions can exert over specific issues or member countries. This is the case of 
Cyprus. In contrast with Greek Cypriots, the Northern part of Cyprus voted ‘yes’ on April 
24, 2004, and let open a window for a solution. High Representative Solana was clear 
when he stated: “For that reason (the Turkish Cyprus yes), the EU is determined to put 
end for a solution…..”
37 and the added, “Now, I can say that the island is no longer an 
obstacle for Turkey-EU Relations. Turks tried to contribute to the solution. … The real 
trouble for me was the position of the leaders from the South of the Island. They snubbed 
the gentlemen’s agreement.”
38 
 
The EU strategy is to support economically the Northern part of Cyprus until a 
political settlement is put in place. There is a proposal of financial aid for €259 million 
for Northern Cyprus and another to allow direct trade to the EU. Cyprus, supported by 
Greece, has objected to the latter.  However, such objection seems to be an issue of 
negotiation within the EU legal framework.  
 
Some preliminary conclusions 
 
1.  New members are unlikely to import and maintain destabilizing policy agendas 
into the EUFP. If that is the case, a process of policy adaptation takes place. 
 
2.  The real challenge of disruption, however, comes not from the diversity of policy 
agendas, but from fixed preferences of EU member states.
39  
 
3.  The EU institutional framework facilitates the accommodation of national 
priorities in the EUFP.   Participation in the Council and the Commission offers 
an opportunity to make use of the EU’s leverage in international affairs.  
4.  In the policy making of external relations, the pattern is not to forge fixed 
alliances between incumbent against acceding states.  Rather, alliances take place 
between the larger countries and the smaller states and also between supporters of 
                                                           
37 Interview with Javier Solana, Imerissia (Greece), May 1, 2004. 
38 “Solana: You Don’t Have a Cyprus Issue Anymore,” ZAMAN On Line, May 3, 2004. 
39 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlargement and 
the Future of European integration,” EUSA Review 15, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 2.  11
the retention of as much national independence as possible, and Europeanists and 
Atlanticists.  
 
5.  The socialization of the norms and practices of the EUFP has been taking place 
since the pre-accession stage.  
 
6.  In terms of foreign policy, the fifth EU enlargement has led to a shift towards the 
Eastern Dimension and the development of the Neighborhood European Policy. 
 
 